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In a framework of a n-union/n-firm oligopoly, this paper analyzes the incentive for 
firms and unions to adopt efficient bargaining, i.e. negotiating over wages together 
with employment. The analysis is conducted for the case of autarchy and for an 
integrated product market. Firm profits, union utility and industry rents are compared 
under two different bargaining regimes – the right-to-manage model and the efficient 
bargaining model. For centralized negotiations, it is shown that under autarchy 
bargaining over wages and emplyment does not necessarliy imply efficiency as total 
industry rents decrease. In the case of an integrated product market, however, 
adopting efficient bargaining raises rents if the market share of the domestic industry 
is relatively small. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The process of wage determination is increasingly perceived as an important 
determinant of the international competitiveness of a firm or an industry. The 
ongoing process of product market integration therefore raises the question as to how 
national systems of wage determination will be affected by increasing international 
competition and vice versa. The institutional determinants of the wage-setting 
process concern several features of the labor market, such as trade union density, 
minimum wage regulations, unemployment benefits and the degree of centralization 
in collective bargaining. 
 
The importance of bargaining centralization has been stressed in a number of papers 
(see for example Calmfors & Driffill (1988), Comeo (1995), Soerensen (1994)). 
Another interesting aspect concerning the interaction between product market 
integration and institutional labor market characteristics is the question of the scope 
of bargaining, i.e. whether firms and unions bargain either over wages solely or over 
wages together with employment. Bargaining over wages is referred to as the right-
to-manage model (Nickell and Andrews, 1983), in which firms and unions bargain 
over wages solely and firms set employment unilaterally. In the efficient bargaining 
model, in contrast, wages together with employment are bargained over (McDonald 
and Solow, 1981). The focus on the scope of bargaining may be motivated by recent 
empirical evidence suggesting a considerable change in labor-management relations 
in the EC and in the United States, since non-pecuniary aspects, such as job-security 
and work time, have become a major issue in union-firm negotiations as foreign 
competition intensified (e.g. Goto (1990), Katz (1993)). In spite of the empirical 
evidence, there has been relatively little economic analysis of this aspect of union-
firm negotiations. 
 
One interesting exception is Yang (1995), who examines this issue from a strategic 
point of view and endogenously determines the mode of bargaining in a duopolistic 
product market. He shows that efficient bargaining over wages and employment is 
preferred by both the firms and the unions and therefore arises in equilibrium. The    2
purpose of the present analysis is to address the question as to whether similar results 
may be derived for the more general case of a n-firm/n-union oligopoly, in which 
wages or wages together with employment will be determined by Nash bargaining 
between firms and unions, respectively. The framework of a unionized oligopoly is 
employed because product market imperfections allow the generation of rents over 
which unions and firms can bargain. 
 
Specifically, the questions addressed in this paper include the following: Does 
bargaining over both wages and employment necessarily imply efficiency in a n-
firm/n-union set-up? Do firms and unions gain from adopting efficient bargaining 
under intensifying foreign competition? How does increasing foreign competition 
change the preferences of the bargaining parties concerning the scope of bargaining? 
 
Evaluating the impact of foreign competition on the bargaining preferences requires 
an examination of firm profits, union utility and industry rents under both bargaining 
regimes in the cases of autarchy and of an integrated product market. Furthermore, 
the following analysis will be conducted for centralized negotiations on the industry-
level. Based on the assumption that on the industry-level, the mode of bargaining 
may be coordinated between each union-firm pair, the scope of bargaining does not 
represent a strategic variable for each bargaining unit. Thus, in the present analysis, 
the bargaining mode will not be endogenously determined, but will be taken as 
exogenously given for the whole industry. 
 
For a closed economy, it will be shown that under certain conditions neither party 
benefits from efficient bargaining and total rents will always be lower. This stands in 
contrast to the well known one-firm/one-union set-up, where efficient bargaining 
turns out to be Pareto-efficient. This result is due to the fact, that for the generalized 
n-firm/n-union setting interactions between the bargaining units have to be taken into 
account. Thus, under autarchy, bargaining over wages and employment is unlikely to 
occur in equilibrium. Considering an integrated product market, it will be shown that 
firms will always be worse off under efficient bargaining. Under certain conditions, 
however, adopting efficient bargaining raises total domestic industry rents and makes  
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the union better off. Allowing for side-payments, this might therefore provide an 
incentive to adopt efficient bargaining as foreign competition intensifies. 
Specifically, it will be shown, that the efficiency of bargaining over wages together 
with employment depends on the market share of the domestic industry.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model. 
Section 3 investigates firm profits, union utility and industry rents under both 
bargaining regimes in the case of autarchy. Section 4 examines the equilibrium 
outcomes for an integrated product market. 
 
2.   The Model 
 
2.1. Union and firm objectives 
 
This section presents a partial-equilibrium model of a unionized oligopoly for a 
homogeneous commodity. The commodity is supplied by n identical profit-
maximizing firms, denoted by  j = 1,..., n. Following the conventional literature, 
firms are assumed to produce with a constant marginal product of labor, the only 
variable input. Normalizing the output per worker to unity yields qj = Lj, where qj is 
output and Lj is employment in firm j. The marginal cost for firm j is the negotiated 
wage wj, which it pays to each of its Lj employees and fixed costs are F. Firms are 
assumed to face a linear inverse demand function 







The operating profits for firm j are given by 
(2)  n ,..., j ), w bQ a ( q ) q ,..., q ( j j n j 1 1 = − − = π . 
Workers in each firm are represented by a firm-specific union. However, by allowing 
collusive wage setting behaviour between unions, this may capture as well the case 
of firm-level organization within an industry-wide union (see Dowrick, 1989).  
Preferences over employment and wages are represented by the union utility function    4
(3)  w ) q M ( q w ) q , w ( U j j j j j j j ⋅ − + ⋅ = ,    n ,..., j 1 =  
 
where w  denotes the alternative wage, which workers may expect to earn elsewhere 
in the economy. w  depends positively on the alternative outside wage as well as 
unemployment benefits, and is negatively affected by the unemployment rate. Since 
the general price level is normalized to unity and the industry considered is assumed 
to be small compared to the rest of the economy, wj denotes both the real and the 
nominal wage. Mj represents exogeneous membership of union j. With   the 
probability of getting a job is  , and the probability of being unemployed is 
(M
j j q M <
j j M / q
j – qj)/Mj. With Mj exogeneous, this utility function can therefore be interpreted as 
the expected income of a worker facing random lay-off or the objective function of a 
utilitarian union, where constant marginal utility reflects the special case of risk-
neutrality (Oswald, 1985). 
 
2.2. Wage and employment determination 
 
Two dominating approaches have been established in the trade union literature to 
model the determination of wages and employment. According to the the right-to-
manage model (Nickel and Andrews, 1983), firms and unions bargain over wages 
solely, and the firm retains the discretion to set employment unilaterally on its labor 
demand curve, after wage negotiations. The commonly used model of a ,monopoly-
union', which sets the wage unilaterally while the firm sets employment, can 
therefore be thought of as a special case of the right-to-manage model conferring 
upon the union the whole bargaining strength. Due to this rather unrealistic 
assumption, the monopoly-union approach has often been criticized and it seems 
therefore reasonable to assume the wage to be fixed by collective agreement and not 
simply imposed by the trade union. However, as long as unions are willing to trade 
off wages for employment, wage employment combinations on the labor demand 
curve turn out to be inefficient in the sense that there exist alternative wage-
employment combinations, which make both the firm and the union better off. 
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Hence, if the outcome is to be Pareto-efficient, bargaining should cover wages as 
well as the employment level (McDonald and Solow, 1981). To illustrate the 
determination of wage and employment under the two different modes of bargaining, 
it may be useful to contrast the case of efficient bargaining with the extreme case of  
a monopoly-union in a one-firm/one-union setting
3. In Figure 1, MR represents the 
firm's marginal-revenue curve (demand for labor),   are the isoprofit curves, which 
intersect the marginal revenue curve at the maximal wage. 
i π
i I are the union 
indifference curves. 
 
According to the monopoly-union model, the union fixes the wage and the firm sets 
employment to maximize profits. The wage-employment outcome is therefore 
determined by the tangency of an indifference curve with the firm's labor demand 
curve. There are, however, a number of wage-employment combinations 
(represented by the lens between the isoprofit curve   and the union indifference 
curve I
0 π
0) at which both the firm and the union are better off. The efficient bargaining 
outcomes lie on the contract curve CC, which can be derived as the locus of 
tangencies between the isoprofit-curves and the union indifference curves. 
 
 
Figure 1 Wage determination in the monopoly-union and 
efficient bargaining model 
 
 
                                                 
3 Here, the subscripty j will be omitted for convenience.   6
Since no bargain will be struck with w w < , the contract curve begins at the 
alternative wage w . It ends reaching the inverse demand function as with a wage 
exceeding the product price the firm's operating profit becomes negative. Equating 


























= ⇔  
Thus, the contract curve derived from the union utility function (3) and the firm's 
profit function (2) turns out to be vertical at the competitive employment level, L , 
thereby reflecting the assumption of risk-neutrality of union members
4. 
 
3.   Collective Bargaining in a Closed Economy 
 
This section explicitly derives and compares wage and employment outcomes in a n-
firm/n-union oligopoly under the two modes of bargaining in the case of centralized 
negotiations. Centralization has two dimensions here. First, it is assumed that the 
mode of bargaining is not a strategic variable for individual unions and firms. Thus, 
throughout the following analysis, the mode of bargaining will not be endogenously 
determined between each union-firm bargaining unit and is instead taken as 
exogenously given for the whole industry. I.e. all union-firm pairs either negotiate 
over wages only or they behave according to the efficient bargaining hypothesis. 
The second dimension along which centralization occurs is related to collusive wage 
setting behaviour. In the efficient bargaining case, however, it will turn out that the 
 
                                                 
4 Generally, it can be shown, that a utility function reflecting risk-aversion of workers implies a 
positively sloped contract curve. Unions produce overemployment as it is ex post more attractive to be 
employed than unemployed. Finally, if unions redistribute income so as to equalize ex post utilities, 
the contract curve will be negatively sloped as the incentive to be employed will be diminished 
(McDonald & Solow, 1981).   7
degree of centralization reflected by wage setting behaviour has no impact on wages 
so that centralization refers to the mode of bargaining solely. 
 
The outcome of negotiations in the right-to-manage model is to be determined by the 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the following two-stage game: In the first 
stage, wages are negotiated between the firms and the unions. In the second stage, 
firms simultaneously set employment in a Cournot-like quantity game. The wage and 
employment outcome under efficient bargaining are in contrast determined by 
solving a one-stage game, in which unions and firms bargain over wages and 
employment simultaneously. 
 
3.1. Efficient bargaining 
 
The outcomes of wage and employment negotiations are modelled in terms of the 
generalized Nash solution, allowing for asymmetric bargaining strength. The 
equilibrium wage is derived by maximizing the asymmetric Nash product with 
respect to qj and wj 
(5)  ( )
) (
j j j j j j j ) ) q , w ( ( ) U ) q , w ( U ( N
γ γ π π
− − − =
1 , 
where γ  ε (0,1) represents bargaining power of the union
5. As γ  approaches 1, the 
union objectives carry all the weight, whereas a value of zero confers upon the firm 
the whole bargaining strength. A value of  = γ  ½ corresponds to the symmetric Nash 
maximand. 
U and π  are the relevant fallback-utilities of the two parties and determine the upper 
and lower limits of the feasible bargaining set on the contract curve. Following 
Binmore et al. (1986), the fallback utilities are to be identified either with each   
side's option during a dispute or with their options should bargaining break down. 
Here, for simplicity, it will be assumed that  0 = π  and  j M w ⋅ = U , which is the  
 
                                                 
5 The asymmetric Nash solution can be developed either from an axiomatic framework (Svejnar, 
1986) or from a strategic perspective (Binmore et al., 1986).   8
alternative income of union members. Given the negotiated wages and quantities of 
the rest of the industry, for each union-firm bargaining unit the equilibrium wage, wj, 
and quantity, qj, must satisfy the following condition:  
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Note, that wages of other firms  ,  i w j i ≠ ,do not enter the first-order conditions (7) 
and (8). An interesting feature of the efficient bargaining equilibrium is therefore the 
fact, that the degree of bargaining centralization reflected by wage conjectures 
concerning wages of other firms is not relevant to the solution of the bargaining 
problem. As Dowrick (1989, p. 1128) has pointed out, ,,a union-firm pair is affected 
by the employment decisions of other firms because these decisions influence 
industry output and price; but wage outcomes affect only the distribution of net 
income within a union-firm pair”. Hence, in the efficient bargaining case, the 
centralization of negotiations only refers to the mode of bargaining. 
 
Based on the assumption, that all bargaining-units are identical, a symmetric industry 
equilibrium can be derived by imposing equal outputs and wages. Combining eqs. 
(7) and (8) yields the generalized contract curve CC corresponding to the n-firm/n-
union set-up: 
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(9)  ' P q P w bq ) bQ a ( w w w j j + − = + − − = −  
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Eq. (9) implies, that the contract curve will be vertical at the competitive 
employment level corresponding to the alternative wage level w . Finally, eq. (8) 
implies: 
(10)  ) ' P q P )( ( P ) bq bQ a )( ( ) bQ a ( w j j j + − + = − − − + − = γ γ γ γ 1 1,  
which is referred to as the Nash bargaining curve or equity locus (Dowrick, 1989).  
The Nash bargaining curve determines the negotiated wage on the contract curve. It 
indicates, that the negotiated wage is a weighted average of the inverse demand 
function and the marginal revenue product. As γ  approaches 1, total rents are 
appropriated by the unions. A value of zero implies  ' P q P j wj + = , so that with eq. (9) 
workers are paid the alternative wage w . 
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According to eq. (11), the equilibrium wage   is an increasing function of the 
alternative wage and the union's bargaining strength; the wage is decreasing in the 
number of firms in the industry. The intuition for this latter result is straightforward. 
The less competitive an industry, the higher will be the pool of rents over which 
 
EB
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unions can bargain (Dowrick, 1989). Note that in the case of risk neutrality the rent 
per union-firm pair is not affected by the bargaining strength of the union as the 
equilibrium quantity will always be equal to the competitive employment level 
corresponding to the alternative wage level, w . 
 
3.2. Bargaining in the right-to-manage model 
 
The equilibrium of the two-stage game will be computed proceeding by backward 
induction. In the second stage of the game, firms set employment simultaneously, 
taking the negotiated industry wage level,  , as given, which applies to all firms of 
the industry. Given the employment decisions of the rest of the industry, maximizing 
profits yields output of firm j, q
j w
j, and industry output, Q: 
(13) 
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The equilibrium industry wage, wj, must satisfy the following condition: 




γ 1 =  
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=    . 
 
Based on the assumption that the bargaining power of both parties will be affected by 
exogenous factors rather than by the scope of bargaining itself, bargaining strength is 
assumed to be the same as in the efficient bargaining case
6. 
                                                 
6 This stands in contrast to Yang (1995), who assumes that under wage bargaining the union has the 
whole bargaining power whereas under wage-employment negotiations bargaining strength is 
symmetric.   11
Thus, Nj will be defined as in eq. (5). Solving (14) implies for the industry wage, wj, 
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Note, that in contrast to the efficient bargaining outcome, the negotiated wage does 
not depend on the number of firms in the industry. Under efficient bargaining, the 
wage depends on the rent per bargaining unit, which in turn is influenced by the 
number of firms. Here, however, the degree of product market competitiveness does 
not influence the wage as profits are maximized given the negotiated wages. 
Therefore the profit-margin constitutes an exogenous wedge between the wage and 
the product price, which does not influence the union's trade-off between 
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3.3. Comparison of the equilibrium outcomes 
 
The solutions for the equilibrium wage, employment level, firm profits, union rents, 
and industry rents under the two modes of bargaining are summarized in Table 1. 
 
                                                 
7 For the first-order-condition see the Appendix.   12
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Table 1 Equilibrium outcomes under the two different bargaining modes for n > 1 
 
Comparing the equilibrium outcomes under efficient bargaining and the right-to-
manage- model reveals that total industry rents will always be lower under efficient 
bargaining, i.e.  , for n > 1 and 0 <  j
EB
j R R < γ  < 1. The interesting thing about this 
result is that it differs from the prediction derived in a one-union/one-firm set-up, 
where  . This can be explained by the fact that if n > 1 interactions between 
the union-firm bargaining units have to be taken into account. As has been already 
stated, under efficient bargaining the quantity settled in firm j is not affected by the 
wages settled in the rest of the industry. Since a firm's competitive position is only 
determined by the negotiated quantity, wages no longer serve as a commitment to 
setting output levels but may rather be thought of as the outcome of the distribution 
of rents within each bargaining unit. Rents per union-firm pair are, in turn, affected 
by the negotiated quantities. Since the union's share of the pie will increase with the 
size of total rents, each firm's quantity will be set so as to maximize the rent per 
bargaining unit, given the union's degree of risk aversion. Since quantities are settled 
non-cooperatively by each bargaining unit, rent maximization per firm does not 
involve a maximization of total industry rents, for n > 1. 
j
EB
j R R >  13
 
In the case of wage bargaining, however, firms set quantities so as to maximize 
profits in the second stage of the game, given the negotiated wage, which exceeds w  
for  γ  > 0. According to eq. (13), the equilibrium quantity under wage bargaining 
turns out to be lower than the quantity under efficient bargaining and gives rise to a 
higher industry price and rents. A wage exceeding the competitive wage, w , may 
therefore be thought of as a device for firms to commit themselves to a lower 
quantity closer to a more cooperative quantity solution. 
 
What about the preferences of the bargaining parties concerning the two modes of 
bargaining? 
Comparing the different profit outcomes leads to the conclusion that firms will 
always be better off under pure wage negotiations, i.e.   for all n. This result 
becomes immediately clear if one considers the fact that all wage-employment 
combinations on the contract curve lie to the right of the marginal-revenue curve. 
Thus, under efficient bargaining the negotiated wage always exceeds the marginal 
revenue product, whereas under the right-to-manage approach each firm has the 




As regards union preferences, comparing the utility outcomes yields U , for 
EB I U >
4 2 1 > − + ) )( n ( γ , which holds for n > 2 and for all γ . Following Yang (1995), an 
intuitive explanation for this conclusion may be provided as follows: Under wage 
negotiations, workers benefit from centralized bargaining due to the union's   
collusive wage behaviour. While firm-level bargaining provides an incentive to cut 
wages in order to gain a larger share of industry output, this competitive mechanism 
disappears on the industry level, where a uniform wage applies to all firms. A higher 
wage can be achieved without losing many jobs. Under efficient bargaining, 
however, this bargaining strength is balanced out, since a higher employment level 
settled in firm j cuts employment in the rest of the industry.   14
Thus, under the conditions derived above, in a n-firm/n-union setting neither party 
profits from adopting efficient bargaining
8. Moreover, total industry rents, i.e. the 
,cake' to be divided between workers and firms, will be lower. This indicates, that 
bargaining over wages as well and employment turns out to be Pareto-inefficient for 
n > 1. For a closed economy, these results may lead to the conclusion, that this mode 
of bargaining is unlikely to occur in equilibrium if bargaining takes place on the 
industry-level. 
 
4. Collective Bargaining in an Integrated Product Market 
 
In this section, the model set up in Section 2 will be extended to analyze the case of 
an integrated product market in two countries. There are again n firms, where m < n 
firms are located in the home country and (n - m) firms in the foreign country. To 
keep the analysis as simple as possible, the labour market in the foreign country is 
assumed to be competitive, with w  equal to the competitive wage in the home 





Firms are again assumed to face the linear inverse demand function 










where qj* represents the output of foreign firm j. Profits for domestic firm j = 1,..., m 
are given by 
 
                                                 
8 As has been demonstrated above, U
EB > U holds for (n + 1)(2 - γ) > 4. Specifically, the case n = 2 
and γ close to unity provides an exception. For n = 2, the wage under efficient bargaining approaches 
the wage demand under wage bargaining as the number of competing firms is very small. However, 
with a relatively high γ, quantities set by firms under wage bargaining turn out to be much lower than 
q
EB , so that U
EB > U in this special case. 
9 Of course, this model must be seen as a very stylized version of foreign competition. For example, 
the introduction of trade unions in the foreign labor market would be a straightforward extension of 
the present analysis. However, the assumption of a competitive foreign labor market might be 
interpreted as an approximation of a foreign unionized labor market, with unions having negligible 
bargaining power.   15
(19)  m ,..., j ), w bQ a ( q *)) q *,... q , q ,..., q ( j j n m m j 1 1 1 = − − = + π , 
where wj is the negotiated wage. Finally, profits for foreign firms can be written as  
(20)  n ,..., m j ), w bQ a ( * q *) q *,... q , q ,..., q ( * j n m m j 1 1 1 + = − − = + π . 
 
4.1. Efficient bargaining in the home country 
 
As in the case of an autarchic regime, wage and employment outcomes under 
efficient bargaining will be determined by solving a one-stage game, in which unions 
and firms bargain over wages and employment simultaneously, given the quantities, 
qj*, set by the foreign firms. 
 
Taking the domestic employment levels as fixed, foreign firms choose quantities, qj*, 
so as to maximize their profits (20). Allowing for symmetry in the home as well as in 
the foreign country, the best response to qj is 
(21) 




j 1 + −
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Given the negotiated wages and quantities of the rest of the industry, for each 
domestic union-firm bargaining  unit the equilibrium wage, w j, and quantity, q j, 
solve: 
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Combining eqs. (23) and (24) yields  
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I U , q , w  
and 
EB
I π  turn out to be identical to the outcomes of the n-firm-oligopoly in a closed 
economy. The intuition for this result is straightforward: Since wage outcomes only 
affect the distribution of net income within a union-firm pair, each firm's quantity 
will be set so as to maximize the rent per bargaining unit independent on the 
domestic firm's wage outcomes as well as the foreign wage. As a consequence, the 
asymmetry concerning the organizational structure of the labor market is only 
relevant to the distribution of rents within domestic firms but not to the equilibrium 
quantities settled by domestic union-firm pairs.    17
4.2. Wage bargaining in the domestic country 
 
In the case of wage bargaining, domestic and foreign firms set employment 
simultaneously, taken the negotiated domestic industry wage level, wj, as fixed. 
Given the employment decisions of the rest of the industry, maximizing domestic 
profits 
(29)  ) w bQ a ( q *) q *,... q , q ,..., q ( j j n m m j − − = +1 1 π ,    m ,..., j 1 = , 
and foreign profits 
(30)  ) w bQ a ( * q *) q *,... q , q ,..., q ( * j n m m j − − = +1 1 π ,    n ,..., m j 1 + =  
yields output of domestic firms, qj, and foreign firms, qj* 
(31)
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The equilibrium industry wage wj must satisfy the following condition 
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subject to (31). 
 
Solving eq. (32)
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10 For the first-order-condition see the Appendix.   18
According to eq. (33), the union wage demand   is an increasing function of the 
number of firms in the home country. Comparing   with   indicates, that the 
wage outcome in the right-to-manage case,  , turns out to be lower than the 
outcome under efficient bargaining, if m < (n + 1)/2. Thus, the smaller the market 
share of an industry the more moderate will be the negotiated wage. The intuition 
behind this result is, that a small market share makes an industry more vulnerable 
from competitive wage setting abroad. This is due to the fact that the market share 
that the country can lose by having to high wage costs increases with the relative size 












Inserting (33) into (31), we obtain for the equilibrium quantities q  and  : 
I
j * q j
(34) 
) n ( b









   and   
) m n )( n ( b
) m ) m n ( )( w a (
* q j 1 1 2
1 2
+ − +




It is easy to demonstrate that . Adopting pure wage bargaining 
induces therefore a shift of rents to the foreign industry. Domestic profits, union 
utility and industry rents are: 
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Comparing the equilibrium outcomes under efficient bargaining and the right-to-
manage model reveals that firm profits will always be lower under efficient 
bargaining as in an autarchic regime. However, a sufficient condition for total 
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What is the intuition behind this result? As regards union utility, it has been shown 
above, that under the right-to-manage approach wages decrease with the domestic 
market share. Since q  for all m, more moderated wage demands are 





As for industry rents, recall that in the case of autarchy rents turned out to be higher 
under the right-to-manage approach because wages above the competitive level w  
served as a commitment to setting lower output levels.  
 
In the case of integration, however, for m < (n + 1)/2 a more restrictive quantity 
policy in the home country does not involve higher domestic rents. The mechanism 
at work here is that, owing to the relatively high foreign market share associated with 
a more aggressive behaviour of foreign firms, the home country's influence on the 
product price is not sufficient to raise product prices and rents. With a small market 
share, adopting efficient bargaining therefore increases the competitiveness of 
domestic firms as firms commit themselves to a more aggressive behaviour in the 
product market. With a relatively high market share, however, output reduction 
raises domestic rents since the market share held by the foreign industry and 




The model presented above casts some doubts on the efficiency of bargaining over 
both employment and wages in a framework of a n-firm/n-union oligopoly if 
bargaining is centralized. For risk-neutral unions, it has been shown, that bargaining 
over both wages and employment does not necessarily imply efficiency as total 
industry rents, i.e. the cake to be divided, decrease. The intuition behind this result is 
that under efficient bargaining wages lose their function of a commitment device to 
lower output levels. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that – under certain 
conditions – neither party benefits from this mode of bargaining, so that efficient 
bargaining is unlikely to emerge in an autarchic regime. In an integrated product 
market, however, efficient bargaining raises total industry rents and union utility if 
the domestic market share is relatively small and the foreign labor market is assumed  
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to be competitive. Allowing for side-payments, this might therefore provide an 
incentive to bargain over wages and employment under intensifying foreign 
competition. Since these results have been derived for a competitive foreign labor 
market, the introduction of foreign unions would be an interesting extension of the 
present model. 
 
The focus of the present analysis has been on efficiency considerations. Of course, 
several questions concerning distributive issues and the well-known incentive 
problem associated with efficient bargaining are not addressed here and remain to be 
answered. 
 
Moreover, underlying the results derived above is the assumption of risk-neutrality 
of union-members. It would therefore be interesting to study whether the results 
obtained here hold for more general union utility functions. Finally, note that another 
important assumption of the present model is that of homogenous goods and Cournot 
competition. This raises the question, whether the results are robust to the 
introduction to commodity heterogeneity and Bertrand conjectures. 
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Appendix 
 
1. Determination of eq. (15)  
 
The first-order-condition of eq. (14) yields:  
 
(A.1.)  ) w w a ( ) w w ( ) ( j j + ⋅ − ⋅ = − ⋅ − ⋅ 2 1 2 γ γ  
 
Solving for wj and inserting wj into (13) yields eq. (15).  
 
2. Determination of eq. (33) 
 
The first-order-condition of eq. (32) is 
 
(A.2) ) m n ( ) w w ( ) ( )) w w ( ) m n ( w a ( j j 1 2 1 + − ⋅ − ⋅ − = − ⋅ + − + − ⋅ γ γ  
 
Solving for   yields eq. (33). 
I
j w
 
 